EXTRACT FROM 2002 APPEAL JUDGEMENT:
http://www.homepage-link.to/JUSTICE/judgements/Bamber/index.htmlGround 5 – evidence relevant to the credibility of Julie Mugford
331. Ground 5 raises issues relating to Julie Mugford. When she had given a statement to the police in September 1985, she had made admissions of dishonest conduct in which she had been involved. She referred to a burglary offence committed jointly with the appellant and to a cheque book fraud committed jointly with Susan Battersby. She was not prosecuted for either offence nor was Susan Battersby prosecuted for the cheque book fraud which she too had admitted to the police. The first limb of ground 5 is a complaint that the prosecution failed to disclose the fact that both Julie Mugford and Susan Battersby were given immunity.
332. As Mr Temple points out, in answer to that aspect of the matter, Julie Mugford and Susan Battersby were not granted immunity as such but a decision was taken by the DPP not to prosecute. We therefore read this ground as being a complaint that the documentation relating to the decision not to prosecute each of the witnesses was not disclosed to the defence.
333. The jury knew about the admissions made to the police. They further knew that neither of the girls had been prosecuted for these offences. Julie Mugford told the jury that she had "got a caution for it". When the judge summed the case up to the jury, he referred to her receiving "a police caution". Mr Turner's submission is that the jury were misled by being told that she had received a "police caution", and that the prosecution were under a duty to correct this wrong impression.
334. It is undoubtedly correct that Julie Mugford had not received a formal police caution in the sense that that expression is clearly understood by police officers and lawyers. It may be that the trial judge in translating Miss Mugford's reference to a caution into a formal police caution had misunderstood the position. However it seems unlikely to us that the jury would have understood the significance of a formal police caution as opposed to any other warning as to her future behaviour.
335. However, whether or not the jury understood the legal distinction of a formal police caution, we fail to see how this could have had any possible impact upon their considerations. What mattered in assessing the weight to be given to the witness's evidence was their own admitted dishonesty, and how they had behaved in relation to such dishonesty, not how the authorities had responded to their admissions. Any failure to correct the judge's reference to a formal police caution cannot be laid at the door of the police since the position was clearly understood by the lawyers and hence such a failure could not in any way taint the evidence of the police officers involved in the inquiry.
