"I have termed the third alternative strategy "strategic defense in depth." The strategy and
force posture of Switzerland provides a weak analogy...
Ukraine has a much bigger military problem executing this strategy than does
Switzerland because its terrain is not nearly as favorable. Unlike Switzerland or other armed
neutrals, Ukraine would be the primary rather than an ancillary objective of the aggressor, so its
dissuasive task is also politically more difficult. Nevertheless, a careful exploitation of the Pripet
Marshes to the North and the Dnipro River should permit the Ukrainians to develop a plausible
bastion that the Russians would have to pay a high price to attack. It must be noted, however,
that for two or three months of the year rivers and marshes freeze, perhaps sufficiently to much
reduce the defensive value of these barriers. Thus, these barriers must be viewed as building
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blocks in a defensive system, not solutions in themselves.
Western Ukraine, though weak industrially, is agriculturally rich and ought to be able to
feed itself. It does have considerable light industry which could be turned to military uses. Most
importantly, it borders Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, all potential sources of supply if NATO
admits these countries, applies diplomatic pressure, and provides resources. These are big "ifs,"
but for the diplomatic reasons outlined above, there are reasons for hope. If Ukraine makes its
western reaches strong enough to resist for a lengthy period, at least several months, and
employs its mobile forces effectively to generate serious combat from the outset of the war,
Ukrainian diplomacy will have a chance. If the Ukrainian bastion can garner enough western
european logistical assistance to survive, Russia will face the prospect of having to employ
large active forces to contain it. It will go even worse for them if western Ukraine can get into
NATO. A divided Ukraine would then assume the role in a new Cold War that divided Germany
assumed in the last one. But the "inner-Ukrainian border" would be much closer to the centers
of Russian power than was the "inner-German" border"
The above from pages 26 and 27 of, "A defence concept for Ukraine", written in 1994.
The Russian reactions to most of the provocations has been the opposite of the expected and gamed response. It's a chess game where one side (Russia) is already aware of the opponents strategy. NATO seem at a loss to penetrate the Russian strategies.